This paper discusses four bankruptcy-related policy issues. First, what is the economic rationale for having a bankruptcy procedure at all and what defines an economically efficient bankruptcy procedure? Second, why did the number of U.S. bankruptcy filings increase so dramatically between 1980 and 2005? Third, a major bankruptcy reform went into effect in the U.S. in 2005-what did it do and how did it affect credit and mortgage markets? Finally, the paper discusses the mortgage crisis, the high social cost of foreclosures, and the difficulty of avoiding foreclosure by voluntarily renegotiation of mortgage contracts, even when such renegotiations are in the joint interest of debtors and creditors. I also discuss the pros and cons of government programs to refinance mortgages and the possibility of giving bankruptcy judges new power to change the terms of mortgage contracts in bankruptcy.
and Wayne Newton (1992) , and two governors-John Connolly of Texas (1986) and J.
Fife Symington of Arizona (1995) .
1 Bankruptcy filings by celebrities and those by ordinary people are related, since celebrity filings generate extensive publicity and send ordinary people the message that filing for bankruptcy is socially acceptable and does not carry any stigma. and their post-bankruptcy earnings, where specified levels of both assets and earnings are exempt. The obligation to repay from earnings usually lasts for a fixed number of years.
Whatever debt remains after filers have met their obligation to repay is discharged. This means that debt is discharged only after filers spend a certain number of years repaying from their future earnings-or else convince a bankruptcy judge that they can never earn enough to repay.
In France, the obligation to repay from post-bankruptcy earnings lasts for 8 to 10 years, in
Germany it lasts for 6, and in the U.K. it lasts for 3. At the other extreme, U.S. bankruptcy law 3 prior to 2005 did not require filers to repay from post-bankruptcy earnings at all. Filers were allowed to choose between a bankruptcy procedure in which they were only obliged to repay from non-exempt assets (Chapter 7) or a procedure in which they were only obliged to repay from non-exempt earnings (Chapter 13). Because few bankruptcy filers have any non-exempt assets, they mainly chose Chapter 7 and were not obliged to repay at all. These provisions made U.S. bankruptcy law extremely pro-debtor.
In addition to the obligation to repay, some countries also impose "shaming" penalties on bankruptcy filers. In the U.K., filers are disqualified from becoming Members of Parliament and from managing a company for three years. In the U.S., filers' names are made public and the filing stays on their credit records for 10 years. 4 The economic justification for having a personal bankruptcy procedure is that individuals benefit from borrowing in order to smooth consumption, but they face uncertainty in their ability-to-repay. Bankruptcy reduces the downside risk of borrowing by discharging some or all debt when debtors' ability-to-repay turns out to be low. It therefore provides debtors with partial consumption insurance. Assuming that debtors are risk-averse, having some consumption insurance makes them better off and increases their willingness to borrow. The higher the bankruptcy exemptions for debtors' assets and earnings and the shorter the obligation to repay from post-bankruptcy earnings, the more consumption insurance that bankruptcy provides.
Another reason for having a personal bankruptcy procedure is that it encourages entrepreneurial behavior. Individuals face more risk when they start businesses than when they work for others, because they are personally liable for their business debts. Having a personal bankruptcy procedure raises their consumption when business failure occurs by discharging both their business and personal debts. It therefore makes risk-averse individuals more likely to go into business in the first place and more likely to start a second business if the first one fails.
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Thus having a personal bankruptcy procedure benefits debtors by reducing the risk they face and encouraging them to borrow-both to smooth consumption and to start businesses. But having a bankruptcy procedure also has drawbacks. One is that the more favorable the bankruptcy procedure is to debtors, the more often they file. In addition, a more favorable 4 In the past, bankrupts were subject to criminal penalties, including banishment, imprisonment, being sold into slavery, and death (Efrat, 2002) . See White (2007b) for a comparison of bankruptcy laws in the U.S. versus several European countries. 5 Even if a business is incorporated, lenders often require owners to guarantee loans to their corporation. This means that if the corporation fails, the owner is likely to file for bankruptcy because of business debts.
bankruptcy procedure encourages debtors to behave opportunistically by filing even when their ability-to-repay is high. Debtors may work less before bankruptcy because the cost of losing their jobs is lower or work less after bankruptcy because they must share their earnings with creditors. All of these drawbacks cause interest rates to rise and the supply of credit to fall. If the bankruptcy system is too pro-debtor, the supply of credit could dry up completely.
A number of hypotheses concerning bankruptcy have been empirically tested. Most of the empirical tests use U.S. data and make use of the fact that U.S. bankruptcy law is uniform all over the country, except that asset exemptions vary across states. In most states, the largest asset exemption is the "homestead" exemption for equity in owner-occupied homes, which ranges from zero in a few states to unlimited in Texas, Florida and four other states. In states with high homestead exemptions, debtors can keep multi-million dollar homes when they file for bankruptcy. They can also keep other types of assets, as long as they convert these assets into home equity before filing. Because states that have higher homestead exemptions provide more consumption insurance to debtors, debtors in these states are predicted to have higher demand for credit, lower supply of credit, and more opportunistic behavior by debtors.
In a series of papers, co-authors and I examined how the variation in asset exemptions across U.S. states affects credit markets. When asset exemptions increase, interest rates are predicted to rise and more loan applicants are predicted to be turned down for credit, but loan sizes could either rise or fall depending on whether the increase in loan demand is bigger or smaller than the decrease in loan supply. Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) found evidence that interest rates on car loans were higher in high-exemption states. We also found that highincome debtors borrowed more in states with high asset exemptions, because lenders accommodated the increase in demand for these debtors; while low-income debtors borrowed less in states with high asset exemptions, because lenders tightened credit standards. Lin and White (2001) found that applicants were more likely to be turned down for home improvement loans in states with high asset exemptions. Berkowitz and White (2004) found that small businesses borrowed less and paid higher interest rates in states with high asset exemptions.
Turning to the effects of the bankruptcy system on entrepreneurial behavior, Wei Fan and I (2003) examined whether there are more entrepreneurs in US states that have higher asset exemptions. Support for this hypothesis would imply that individuals' higher propensity to own businesses in states with higher asset exemptions more than offsets the deterrent effect of tighter credit supply in these states. We found that states with unlimited homestead exemptions had around one-third more entrepreneurs than states with low homestead exemptions. Armour and Cummings (2005) tested the same hypothesis using cross-country data. Because many features of bankruptcy law differ across countries, they focused on the length of the period during which bankruptcy filers are obliged to repay from earnings, where a shorter period implies a more prodebtor bankruptcy law. They found that countries with shorter repayment periods in bankruptcy have more entrepreneurs. Fay, Hurst and White (2002) examined the hypothesis that pro-debtor bankruptcy laws encourage opportunistic behavior. Specifically they tested whether debtors are more likely to file for bankruptcy when their financial gain from filing is higher, where the financial gain from filing equals the amount of debt discharged in bankruptcy minus the amount debtors must repay.
Their results showed that for every $1,000 increase in debtors' financial gain from bankruptcy, the filing rate rose by 7 percent. Grant and Koeniger (2005) used aggregate state-year data for U.S. states to test whether states with more pro-debtor bankruptcy laws have less variation in their aggregate consumption levels over time, because consumption is more fully insured. They found that the variance of consumption over time was lower in states with higher asset exemption levels.
What do these considerations suggest in terms of formulating an economically efficient personal bankruptcy law? Consider first the determination of the optimal asset exemption level.
The basic tradeoff is that an increase in the exemption level makes risk-averse debtors better off because their consumption is more fully insured, but makes all debtors worse off because the supply of credit falls. If all debtors were risk-neutral, the optimal asset exemption level would therefore be zero. But as the average debtor becomes more risk-averse, the optimal asset exemption level rises. Now consider the determination of the optimal earnings exemption. A higher earnings exemption similarly makes risk-averse debtors better off by partially insuring their consumption, but makes all debtors worse off because the supply of credit falls. An additional consideration is that a low exemption for earnings may discourage debtors from working after bankruptcy, particularly if most or all of their marginal earnings must be paid to creditors. So an increase in the earnings exemption can improve efficiency by reducing the distortion to debtors' post-bankruptcy labor supply. Loosely speaking, these considerations suggest that the optimal earnings exemption in bankruptcy is relatively high, while the optimal asset exemption is relatively low. Neither exemption should be so high that credit markets break down.
Finally, consider shaming penalties for bankruptcy. Higher shaming penalties make riskaverse debtors worse off because they do not wish to face the risk of paying these penalties, but they make all debtors better off by reducing opportunistic behavior, increasing debtors' labor supply (since debtors work harder to avoid going bankrupt, and increasing the supply of credit. This suggests that the optimal level of shaming penalties could be positive rather than zero.
Explaining the Rise in US Bankruptcy Filings Since 1980
Figure 1 In any case, job loss and health problems cannot explain the increase in bankruptcy filings over the 25-year period, because they did not increase substantially over the period. The U.S. Bureau, 1990 and 2007, table 144 ).
Overall, neither job loss nor health-related problems are able to explain the large increase in bankruptcy filings over the last 25 years.
Increased availability of casino gambling seems a more promising explanation for the rise in bankruptcy filings, since gambling was allowed only in Nevada and Atlantic City in 1980 but had spread over most of the country by 2005. A recent study by Barron, Staten, and Wilshusen (2002) found that bankruptcy filing rates were significantly higher in counties that contained a casino or were adjacent to a county with a casino than in counties that were further from casinos. Fannie Mae began purchasing and securitizing conventional mortgages in the 1970's. In the 1990's, private banks began purchasing and securitizing non-conventional mortgages, including adjustable-rate mortgages, jumbo mortgages, negative amortization mortgages, and mortgages with low or zero down-payments. Except for jumbos, these new types of mortgages were often marketed to riskier, lower-income debtors who did not qualify for conventional mortgages.
Around 63% of mortgage debt was securitized as of 2005.
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But while additional credit card debt gives debtors a stronger incentive to file for bankruptcy, the relationship between additional mortgage debt and bankruptcy is less straight-forward. This is because-under current law-mortgage debt cannot be discharged in bankruptcy and therefore the only way for debtors to escape their mortgage commitments is to give up their homes. They can do so regardless of whether they file for bankruptcy. Nonetheless debtors who are in trouble paying their mortgages can benefit from filing for bankruptcy. I discuss how bankruptcy helps debtors who are homeowners save their homes in the next section.
The 2005 Bankruptcy Reform-What Did It Do?
The dramatic increase in the number of bankruptcy filings caused lenders to lobby long and hard for bankruptcy reform and they finally succeeded in 2005. To briefly summarize a complicated piece of legislation, there were two major changes. The first was the adoption of a "means test" which requires higher-income bankruptcy filers to use some of their future earnings to repay. The means test specifies a new procedure for calculating each filer's earnings exemption. Filers whose earnings exceed the exemption by more than $167 per month (or $2000 per year) can no longer file under Chapter 7; instead they must file under Chapter 13 if they file for bankruptcy at all. In Chapter 13, they must use all of their non-exempt earnings for five years to repay debt. Thus for the first time, U.S. bankruptcy law no longer fully exempts debtors' post-bankruptcy earnings from the obligation to repay.
However the procedure for determining the earnings exemption is fairly generous to debtors. The minimum earnings exemption equals the median family income in the debtor's state of residence, so that all debtors in the lower half of the income distribution in their states are allowed to file under Chapter 7. As the data discussed above suggests, the median filer's income is only about half of median U.S. family income, so that the vast majority of bankruptcy filers still qualify for Chapter 7 based on having below-median income. Filers whose incomes are above the median compute their earnings exemptions by summing pre-determined allowances for rent, transportation and personal expenditures and then adding their actual expenditures for taxes, insurance, care of disabled relatives, telecommunications costs, security costs, and secured debt payments. The formula is generous enough that most debtors qualify for
Chapter 7 even if their incomes are in the top decile of the income distribution. In addition, filers whose debts are primarily due to a failed business can bypass the means test entirely and file under Chapter 7 regardless of their incomes.
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The second major change under the 2005 bankruptcy reform was to raise debtors' cost of filing for bankruptcy by imposing a number of new requirements on both debtors and bankruptcy lawyers. Debtors are now required to submit copies of their past tax returns (even if they never filed tax returns), take a credit counseling course before they file and a debt management course before they receive a discharge, and pay higher filing fees. Bankruptcy lawyers are now subject to new registration requirements, they must certify the accuracy of all the information that debtors provide on their bankruptcy forms, and they can be found liable if debtors provide false or misleading formation. These changes caused bankruptcy lawyers to raise their fees. Overall, the first of the two changes was intended to discourage high-income debtors from filing by forcing them to repay some of their debts in Chapter 13, while the second was intended to discourage lower-income debtors from filing by raising their filing costs. What actually happened as a result of these changes? from a median level of $700 to $1,100 for Chapter 7 and from a median level of $2,000 to $3,000 for Chapter 13 (GAO, 2008) . These higher costs suggest that the number of bankruptcy filing is likely to remain at a lower level than before the reform. Third, credit card lending became more profitable: lenders' charge-off rates (losses due to default and bankruptcy) fell from around 6 percent to 3 percent and the share prices of publicly-traded debt collection firms increased relative to the market (Ashcraft, Dick and Morgan, 2007 Debtors must repay their mortgage arrears--plus interest-over five years as part of their Chapter 13 repayment plans and they must also make all of their normal mortgage payments. While debtors are theoretically required to repay unsecured debt in Chapter 13 as well, in practice most repay only the mortgage. This is because the mortgage payment comes first and debtors are only required to use their non-exempt incomes to repay. Thus if debtors' mortgage payments exceed their non-exempt income, then they are not required to repay any unsecured debt. Chapter 13 as a strategy for debtors to save their homes existed before the 2005 bankruptcy reform and was not changed by the reform, except that the costs of filing for bankruptcy rose.
In a recent paper, Ning Zhu and I (2007) examined a sample of debtors who filed under
Chapter 13 in 2006. Our goal was to understand whether debtors file under Chapter 13 to save their homes or because the means test now forces them to do so. We found that 96% of Chapter 13 filers in our sample were homeowners and 78% passed the means test-meaning that they could have filed under Chapter 7. About 90% of Chapter 13 filers proposed repayment plans and only 9% of plans proposed to repay only unsecured debt. 16 Thus while Chapter 13 has become relatively more important since the adoption of bankruptcy reform, debtors are still using it to save their homes rather than to repay unsecured debt.
Finally, filing for bankruptcy under either chapter also helps debtors who default on their mortgages and do not wish to save their homes. This is because, if the house sells in foreclosure for less than the amount owed, in some states the lender has a claim on the debtor for the difference. This claim can be discharged in bankruptcy.
Overall, the 2005 bankruptcy reform benefitted creditors by raising the cost of filing for bankruptcy, but discouraged debtors from behaving opportunistically by introducing a means test for Chapter 7. The reform also made it more costly for debtors to use bankruptcy to save their homes.
Bankruptcy and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis
My last topic is how bankruptcy relates to the subprime mortgage crisis. About 1 Given that foreclosures are costly to both borrowers and lenders, avoiding default is in both sides' interest and it might be expected that they would voluntarily renegotiate many mortgage contracts. But very few renegotiations have in fact occurred-why? The first part of the answer is that many mortgages are held in mortgage-backed securities. These securities sometimes do not allow the terms of the underlying mortgages to be modified at all and sometimes allow only a limited number of mortgages, usually 5%, to be modified. Even when renegotiation is allowed, owners of mortgage-backed securities often prefer foreclosure because it is quicker and they fear that debtors will eventually default on the renegotiated mortgage. In addition, securitized mortgages have multiple sets of owners with differing levels of priority.
17 See Bair (2008) . 18 One recent study found that each foreclosure causes a reduction of $150,000 in the total value of nearby homes. See Immergluck and Smith (2006) . 19 A number of studies have found that reductions in home values are an important determinant of default and foreclosure. See, for example, Gerardi et al (2007) .
When renegotiations occur, the changes generally make one set of owners better off and others worse off, so that the latter try to block them. Thus securitization makes renegotiation much more difficult. Another problem is that many distressed homeowners have second as well as first mortgages, and second mortgage-holders have the right to prevent modification of first mortgages unless the second mortgage is paid off. Since the decline in housing values has made many second mortgages worthless, second mortgage-holders have little incentive to cooperate.
All mortgage securities have a servicer who collects the mortgage payments and represents the owners in renegotiations. But the contracts between security owners and servicers also discourage renegotiation. One problem is that servicers are compensated for their costs of foreclosing, but not for the costs of renegotiating. Another is that servicers impose fees when debtors pay late or default and servicing contracts allow them to keep these fees if they can collect them. Since renegotiating a mortgage often involves giving up these fees, they give servicers an additional incentive to foreclose. Thus most mortgage servicing contracts are unsuited to dealing with the housing crisis. 21 See Cordell et al (2008) and Pew Charitable Trust (2008, p. 34) for data on renegotiations.
Housing Administration will provide and guarantee new 30-year, fixed-rate mortgages to eligible homeowners. The new mortgages will be for 90% of the homes' current market value. (2) In order to qualify, homeowners' new mortgage payments must be less than 31% of their income and the house must be the homeowner's principle residence. (3) First mortgage-holders will receive 85% of the current market value of the house, which means that they lose more than the decline in value of the house. (4) First mortgage-holders must consent to the refinancing. (4) The government will bear all losses if the debtor defaults on the refinanced mortgage, but it and second mortgage-holders will receive part of the future capital appreciation of the house. The
Congressional Budget Office (2008) predicts that around 400,000 mortgages will be refinanced under the program.
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The feature of this program that is most problematic is the requirement that existing mortgage lenders consent to the refinancing. The consent requirement inevitably means that adverse selection will occur, since lenders have an incentive to consent to refinancing only if they predict that the debtor is likely to default. This suggests that many debtors will default even on the refinanced mortgages and the government will then bear the costs. The
Congressional Budget Office recently estimated that around one-third of refinanced mortgages would default (Herzenhorn, 2008) . An additional problem is that lenders have an incentive to frequently refuse their consent in order to discourage strategic behavior by relatively well-off debtors. These debtors have an incentive to apply for refinancing under the program, but would repay their original mortgages if lenders refuse. Since lenders cannot perfectly distinguish between debtors who apply strategically and those who apply because they cannot afford to repay, they have an incentive to frequently refuse their consent in order to discourage strategic behavior. As a result, some mortgages will not be refinanced even when debtors cannot afford to repay and will otherwise default. Requiring lenders' consent thus means that the "Hope for
Homeowners" program cannot prevent all foreclosures, even in situations where both sides would gain from participating. Thus from an economic efficiency standpoint, allowing lenders to block refinancing is socially costly.
A similar approach was recently proposed by Sheila Bair, Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The FDIC program also modifies mortgages to reduce debtors' mortgage payments to 31% of their gross income. Lenders, rather than the government, must hold the modified mortgages, but the government will absorb up to 50% of the loss if debtors default on the modified mortgages. This approach has the advantage that lenders' consent is not required, but has the problem that strategic behavior will result in too many-rather than too few--mortgages being modified.
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A third approach to solving the mortgage crisis is to expand the save-your-home feature of bankruptcy by allowing bankruptcy judges to modify residential mortgages. Judges would divide mortgages that are underwater into a secured portion equal to the current market value of the home and an unsecured portion equal to the difference between the mortgage principle and the current market value of the home. The latter would be treated like any other unsecured claim in bankruptcy and could be discharged in Chapter 7 or paid under the debtor's Chapter 13 repayment plan if the debtor has enough non-exempt income. Bankruptcy judges would also have the power to discharge excessive fees or penalties imposed by lenders, to reduce interest rates if they are excessive, and/or to convert variable-interest-rate mortgages to fixed-rate.
Under current law, bankruptcy judges have the power to change the terms of mortgages if they are secured by vacation homes, multi-family homes, or boats, but not if they are secured by the debtor's principle residence. So the proposed reform would make the treatment in bankruptcy of mortgages secured by a debtor's primary residence the same as the treatment in bankruptcy of other secured loans.
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The main advantage of allowing mortgage modification in bankruptcy is that it provides an alternative route for homeowners whose mortgages cannot be modified under the other approaches. Homeowners may find themselves in this situation because their loans are part of a private mortgage-backed security that does not allow modification or because the first-or second-mortgage lender refuses to consent. Other homeowners may find themselves in this situation because their mortgage payments are less than 31% of income, but they would nonetheless default unless modification occurs. These defaults can be avoided by allowing 23 The FDIC is applying this approach to loans held by IndyMac Bank, which it took over in July 2008, and has argued that it should be applied more broadly. See Bair (2008) . 24 See Goodman and Levitin (2008) for discussion.
judges to modify mortgages in bankruptcy. Another important advantage of allowing mortgage modification in bankruptcy is that the costs would be absorbed by mortgage lenders, so that the bankruptcy route would be available even if government programs exhausted their funding.
What are the drawbacks of allowing mortgage modification in bankruptcy? One is that it would encourage strategic behavior by debtors who gain from defaulting because their mortgages are underwater, but who can afford to repay their original mortgages. This cost is likely to be small, because most strategic behavior can be detected by bankruptcy trustees, who have extensive information about debtors' financial situations. An additional way to limit strategic behavior would be to require all debtors seeking mortgage modification to file under
Chapter 13, where they must follow a court-supervised repayment plan for five years. A second consideration-forcefully made by lenders-is that allowing mortgage modification in bankruptcy would reduce the supply of mortgage credit in the future. Levitin and Goodman (2008) have argued that this is unlikely, since in the past, mortgages that could or could not be modified in bankruptcy carried virtually the same interest rates. 
